By Ezra Vernon

In March 2026, Roberto De Zerbi returned to the Premier League, taking over Tottenham Hotspur, who sat 17th, one point clear of the relegation zone, with seven matches remaining to avoid the drop. A remarkable appointment, De Zerbi arrived not as an inexperienced firefighter, but as a manager whose intricate, innovative attacking philosophy had earned him respect across Europe years earlier. His work at Brighton, where he guided the south-coast club to its highest-ever Premier League finish and European qualification, had established him as one of football’s avant-garde managers.

However, bringing that philosophy to Tottenham presented a different challenge. Would De Zerbi simply replicate the tactics that took his Seagulls to new heights, or would he have to adapt his approach for a new squad and a new league landscape?

The De Zerbi Blueprint

In 2022, when De Zerbi joined Brighton & Hove Albion from Shakhtar Donetsk, he brought with him distinctive and intriguing principles of football. While Pep Guardiola had long standardised constant, calculated possession, De Zerbi’s system brought something new, in the form of deep, dangerous build-up to provoke pressure. The Italian manager’s Seagulls quickly became one of the league’s most devastating opponents, tearing teams apart by transitioning from slow, patient build-up into blistering attacks.

De Zerbi wanted not just to maintain the ball, but to dictate the movements of his adversaries. Brighton possessed the ball in such a way that teams were enticed into pressing, manipulating their opposition’s defensive block. Players saw what they believed was an opportunity to win the ball and left the area they were meant to protect. This created space, which Brighton would quickly exploit.

Brighton would look to invite pressure, playing short passes between the centre-backs and the goalkeeper deep in their own half. The centre-backs would split very wide to the edge of the 18-yard box, allowing the goalkeeper to step into the space between them. This spread out the opposition press, while Brighton’s double pivot came deeper into a central bottleneck, preparing for the breakthrough. Coaches’ Voice’s analysis of De Zerbi’s tactics explains how the goalkeeper and double pivot were central to this deep build-up.

Another key trait of this Brighton build-up was the tendency for one of the Brighton centre-backs, often Lewis Dunk, to stop the ball completely with their studs, standing still with the ball at their feet. This was another trap De Zerbi had developed to manipulate the opposition’s defensive structure, forcing a player to break the shape and press, creating a vacuum of space behind them. Sky Sports’ explanation of De Zerbi’s Brighton tactics explores how this approach encouraged opponents to commit players forward.

Once the press was triggered and space was created, Brighton would attack with speed, operating through deliberate, repeatable sequences. The most common of these sequences was dubbed ‘Up-Back-Through’. The ball would go from the centre-back to a dropping ten or centre-forward (up), who dropped it first-time to a supporting midfielder or defender (back). The midfielder or defender would then play it through to a surging third-man runner beyond the press (through). This routine allowed Brighton to continuously create quick transitions into goalscoring opportunities.

Brighton, under De Zerbi’s leadership, experienced what was at that point the most successful period in their history, finishing sixth in the league. The Seagulls ended the 2022/23 campaign as the fourth most prolific team, scoring 72 goals over the league season. De Zerbi gained respect around the football world, and his approach became a recognisable tactical identity. The Premier League’s own analysis of Brighton’s possession and attacking approach provides further context for the risks and rewards of his football.

The Premier League’s Counter-Revolution

Over De Zerbi’s first season with Brighton, his style of football, dubbed “De Zerbismo”, functioned as a tactical anomaly. By mid-2023, De Zerbismo had become one of the most analysed tactical blueprints in the football world.

“Roberto De Zerbi is one of the most influential managers in the last 20 years. There is no team that plays the way they play — it’s unique.” — Pep Guardiola

“They are one of the teams I try to learn a lot from.” — Pep Guardiola

“Keep turning the football world upside down.” — Jürgen Klopp

Elite managers across England and Europe began adopting elements of his build-up style. The “box midfield”, which was formed out of a 3–2 or 2–4 base structure, became a central part of Manchester City’s system in their Treble-winning campaign. Structural central overloads became a league-wide trend, heavily utilised by Ange Postecoglou in his first, successful season at Tottenham Hotspur. The Premier League’s look at Guardiola’s tactical innovations offers useful context for the development of the box midfield and related structures.

Managers across the league rewired their defensive approaches to neutralise the style of play De Zerbi created. Opponents learned they did not need to react to Brighton’s invitations the way De Zerbi wanted. Brighton wanted opponents to press their defensive line in order to create space behind the first line, but opponents began to stand off and chose not to press. Instead, teams would shift into a compact mid-block, covering the central spaces. Rather than chasing the ball, forwards and midfielders would use their cover shadows to deny access to the Brighton double pivot. This made Brighton’s build-up less threatening, forcing them into repetitive, sideways possession.

Some teams shifted to aggressive, man-to-man pressing systems, which disrupted Brighton’s quick short-passing combinations. Midfielders could be closely marked, reducing the availability of free forward passes. The studs-on-the-ball technique became less effective when opponents refused to break their defensive structure. The Up-Back-Through sequence became significantly harder to execute when intended receivers and passing lanes were covered by the more pragmatic defences. Different defensive approaches presented Brighton with different problems. A passive block denied space; aggressive pressing denied time and freedom. Additionally, when opponents successfully operated a high man-to-man press and won the ball deep, Brighton’s rest defence was exposed.

De Zerbi’s principles remained influential, and many teams continued to experience success with parts of his system, but opponents became increasingly familiar with his tactics. This meant De Zerbi would have to do what he had done when he first created his style of play, and innovate.

The Tottenham Adaptation

When De Zerbi walked into Tottenham with seven matches between them and the possibility of relegation, the Italian manager had to find a way to keep a hurting, fractured club in the Premier League. He managed this by implementing simple tactics, involving basic possession and attacking and defensive structures, to get the team to a place where they could get the results they needed, no matter how far it strayed from his true style of football. Once their survival was secured, De Zerbi and the Tottenham board looked forward to a summer transfer window and pre-season in which they would construct a team fit for De Zerbi to lead up the table.

What De Zerbi inherited was an incomplete squad, lacking unity and a collective identity. Over his weeks in charge at the back end of the 2025/26 season, De Zerbi had identified the players within the club that fit his ideals, including Antonín Kinský, Pedro Porro, Micky van de Ven, James Maddison, Mohammed Kudus, Dejan Kulusevski and Mathys Tel. This meant De Zerbi needed to bring in support at centre-back, in the double pivot, at full-back and across the frontline. The board backed him, spending upwards of £300m to bring in Jan Paul van Hecke, Marcos Senesi, Mateus Fernandes, Sandro Tonali, Andrew Robertson, Savio and Omar Marmoush, among others.

The signings of van Hecke, who the Italian had previously worked with, and Senesi brought De Zerbi two Premier League-proven defenders, who were both in the top three defenders for most progressive passes the previous league season. Mateus Fernandes and Sandro Tonali provided a brand-new double pivot, with elite technical ability, forward passing and ball-winning between them. Andrew Robertson brought experience, flexibility and width to the full-back position. Finally, the late-window signings of Savio and Marmoush gave Tottenham’s frontline dynamic movement, pace, power, dribbling ability and finishing. Opta Analyst’s examination of Tottenham’s recruitment under De Zerbi provides further detail on the player profiles and statistical thinking behind the rebuild.

With a heavily improved squad and a full pre-season, De Zerbi built his tactical structure for his Tottenham team. In the first phase, Antonín Kinský forms a back three with the centre-back pairing, often Micky van de Ven and Jan Paul van Hecke. Kinský is instructed to put his foot on the ball in order to bait the opposition press, similar to the tactic De Zerbi used at Brighton. This creates a 3v2 at the top of the 18-yard box, giving Tottenham a numerical advantage in build-up. By having Kinský act as a true central passing option, the centre-backs can split wide and step higher into positions that improve their passing angles. This stretches the opponent’s press to the absolute limit, allowing van Hecke and van de Ven to use their progressive passing ability to find vertical balls downfield.

A key trait of De Zerbi’s Brighton side was the wide full-backs, which he has adjusted slightly at Tottenham. While Andy Robertson stays wide, Pedro Porro will often come inside to become a midfielder, meaning Tottenham play with asymmetric full-backs.

While De Zerbi’s Brighton short passing was integral to the way they played, his Tottenham team frequently play long, diagonal passes to switch the play. When the opposition press, making the centre of the field compact, these longer passes can help them bypass the central press. This allows the Lilywhites to quickly find their wingers in an isolated 1v1. Van Hecke, van de Ven, Tonali and Fernandes are all highly capable of this pass.

Tottenham’s new double pivot, often made up of Sandro Tonali and Mateus Fernandes, is crucial to De Zerbi’s team. The two consistently perform a sequence that can be described as “bait and box”, where Fernandes will drop deep to receive off the centre-backs underneath immense pressure, while Tonali pulls higher to receive the layoff and drive the ball further up the field.

Next, De Zerbi developed his frontline’s tactics. Wingers like Kudus, Tel and Savio start as wide as possible, attempting to draw opposition full-backs away from the centre-backs, creating huge diagonal passing lanes. The centre-forward, often Marmoush or Solanke, pins the back line by threatening to run into space, while the number ten will come lower to help form a five-man X-Box with the two pivots and centre-backs.

After the first phase of build-up, the centre-backs transition from their wide position to forming a more traditional, stable pairing at the bottom of the midfield structure. The positioning of the centre-backs, double pivot and number ten creates Tottenham’s X-Box shape in build-up. The X-Box creates a central numerical advantage, often presenting as a 5v4 or 5v3 in a critical area of the pitch. This allows them to bait the press, rendering the opposition’s front players useless. The wide positioning of the wingers allows them to play quickly after getting past the press, finding the open winger in a 1v1 situation, who can cut in to bring danger.

Match Analysis

In the 2–0 win against Chelsea, Tottenham demonstrated the principles of De Zerbi’s new system time and time again. Chelsea’s match report provides the match details and team context.

Here, Tottenham establish their basic X-Box shape. Van Hecke and Micky van de Ven split, forming the bottom of the shape. Maddison drops from his advanced position to form a line with Tonali, while Fernandes comes into the middle of the box.

Next, Tottenham bait the three Chelsea pressers by making them believe they have an opportunity to win the ball. The ball is played to James Maddison, who quickly bounces it to Fernandes in the centre. The three Chelsea players jump to Fernandes as quickly as possible.

Fernandes bypasses the Chelsea press, connecting with Tonali, who plays Maddison. Maddison then drives forward into the open space ahead of him, with three Chelsea players out of the equation.

Maddison plays a trivela pass to Mathys Tel, who receives the ball on the touchline in a 1v1 with Chelsea’s full-back, who has been pulled away from his centre-backs.

Mathys Tel uses his bravery, dribbling ability and speed to beat his man, driving into the Chelsea penalty box before being brought down. He was unlucky not to win a penalty.

How Has De Zerbi Evolved?

From Brighton to Tottenham, De Zerbi’s original principles of football are still visible in the way his team currently play, though the way he implements them has changed. There is an important distinction between a new footballing philosophy and one that has simply evolved to survive in different conditions.

The main pillars of De Zerbismo that were brought to the Premier League in 2022 have mainly stuck with him. Tottenham play in a risky, possession-based style of football, built around inviting opposition pressure, manipulating defensive structures, creating numerical advantages and exploiting the space left by pressing opponents. Against Chelsea, Tottenham baited the press, just like the Seagulls did when De Zerbi took over. Another core piece of De Zerbi’s original football is creating numerical advantages, like Tottenham did by dropping Maddison from the front line to join Tonali, and having Fernandes come lower. Finally, the way De Zerbi’s side look to attack the spaces created behind the press is reminiscent of his 2022/23 Brighton team.

De Zerbi’s box midfield, which became mainstream across the football world, has been adapted into a five-man X-Box, serving the same purpose of creating a numerical advantage centrally to bait the press, but presented in a way useful to the modern game. Another change in style was the implementation of asymmetric full-backs, with Pedro Porro often coming central and Andy Robertson staying wide. This differs from the system used at Brighton, where both full-backs would often stay wide. The last major difference between De Zerbi’s two systems is how they create wide 1v1s. Tottenham’s style of play adds far more priority to the centre-backs and pivots making long, vertical or diagonal switches of play, which De Zerbi used much less at Brighton. This helps Tottenham’s wingers receive the ball isolated with a full-back, allowing them to drive forward.

The change in style cannot solely be attributed to De Zerbi’s tactical ingenuity, but also to the player profiles at the Italian coach’s disposal. While the majority of the major tactical differences are purposeful decisions made to succeed in the modern Premier League landscape, his new system can only be executed because of the raw, dynamic, athletic abilities of his new summer signings. De Zerbi’s pivot of Caicedo and Mac Allister at Brighton had similar traits to Fernandes and Tonali, with both sets of players offering impressive distance-covering, ball-winning and ball-carrying abilities. The Tottenham duo, however, are given more freedom to break lines vertically. Van Hecke and van de Ven are intense and physical defenders, also capable of launching the precise long downfield or diagonal passes needed in De Zerbi’s new system. The athletic, pacy wingers and attackers at his disposal, including Kudus, Solanke, Marmoush and Tel, offer the ability to quickly beat their man in transition, creating goalscoring chances.

Conclusion

De Zerbi had to evolve his football to adjust to a new Premier League landscape. The basic principles of his De Zerbismo football stayed the same from Brighton to Tottenham, but the way the traits were implemented changed between De Zerbi’s two stints in English football. De Zerbi was forced to be flexible, and in doing so created a more dynamic, modern version of his style of play. This evolution sets Tottenham up to experience success under De Zerbi, playing an attractive brand of football.